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CANADIAN SAME SEX RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION 
STRUGGLES AND THE CONTRADICTORY  NATURE OF 
LEGAL VICTORIES  
BRENDA COSSMAN1 
In my comments today, I want to pick up on one of the themes running through 
virtually all of the papers in this symposium–the contradictory nature of law.  Legal 
victories–and defeats–are always fragile, partial and contradictory.2  The perspective 
I bring to this theme is a Canadian one, where in the context of gay and lesbian 
struggles, legal victories now outweigh legal defeats.  I will tell a story of these legal 
victories, which resulted in a much celebrated case in 1999 known as M v. H., in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the equality rights of same sex 
couples, and struck down a law with an opposite sex definition of spouse.3  This may 
sound like an unequivocal legal victory for gays and lesbians.  But, the story that I 
want to tell teases out a more complicated understanding of the case, which will 
illustrate the contradictory nature of legal strategies and legal victories.  Legal 
victories are never only legal victories, just as legal defeats are never only legal 
defeats.   
GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Gay men and lesbians have taken their lives to the Supreme Court of Canada four 
times in the last decade.  The first case involved a gay man, Brian Mossop, who 
challenged his employer’s refusal to grant him a bereavement leave to attend his 
partner’s father’s funeral, on the ground that he was not a spouse.4  The case was 
dismissed by the majority of the Supreme Court on a narrow ground, and as a result, 
the majority did not address the merits of the case.  However, a strong dissenting 
opinion, by Madame Justice L’Heureux Dube (one of two women on the Court) 
provided a glimmer of hope.  The dissenting opinion is an eloquent, sophisticated 
discussion of the meaning of families, with a plea to recognizing that real family 
values would only be furthered by recognizing ‘non-traditional’ families.   
Given the range of human preferences and possibilities, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that families may take many forms….It is not 
anti-family to support protection for non-traditional families.  The 
traditional family is not the only family form and non-traditional family 
forms may equally advance true family values.5 
Accordingly, in her dissenting view, Mossop and his partner ought to have been 
recognized as family.  
                                                                
1Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada. 
2JANINE BRODIE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 126 (1992) (quoting Shelley Gavigan).  
3M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.  
4Mossop v. A.-G. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554. 
5Id. at 634.  
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The second case involved a gay couple who had been together for 42 years.6  
Egan and Nesbitt challenged the federal Government’s refusal to grant a spousal 
pension benefit, on the ground that they were not spouses.  This time, the majority of 
the Court, in a five to four opinion, held that Egan and Nesbitt’s equality rights had 
been violated.  The majority held that sexual orientation was a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms7 even 
though it was not listed as an enumerated ground.  Further, the Court held that the 
opposite sex definition of spouse in the federal Old Age Security Act8 discriminated 
on the basis of sexual orientation, and therefore constituted a violation of Egan and 
Nesbitt’s equality rights.  However, the majority also held that the violation was a 
reasonable limit on equality rights, within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter.9  
Notably, the decision had an entirely different majority, with one justice–Mr. Justice 
Sopinka–as the swing vote.  Justice Sopinka held that since gays and lesbians were a 
fairly new equality seeking group, the government needed to be given some latitude 
in deciding when and how to extend legal protections.  And there was also the fact 
that extending the definition of spouse to include same sex couples in this case 
would cost the government money, which in these days of fiscal conservatism, courts 
should be very careful about imposing.   
Egan and Nesbitt then stands as a legal victory within a loss.  For the very first 
time, the Supreme Court of Canada held that gays and lesbians are protected by the 
Constitution; that the Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  But, they were not yet entitled to the legal goodies.  
The third case involved a gay school teacher who was fired from his job at a 
Catholic school because he was gay.10  Delwin Vriend brought a challenge to the 
Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act,11 the provincial human rights code 
analogous to state civil rights codes, for failing to include sexual orientation as a 
prohibited group of discrimination.  Alberta–a very conservative place–was the only 
province that had not amended its human rights code to include sexual orientation.  
                                                                
6Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
7Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c.11. [hereinafter the Charter]  Section 15(1) provides, “Every individual is equal before 
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” 
8R.S.C. 1985, c. O-9, s. 2. 
9Section 1 of the Charter provides “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.  In 
Canadian constitutional law, any Charter challenge proceeds as a two step process.  First, the 
Court must determined if the specified right, such as equality rights under § 15 have been 
violated.  Second, (and only if the answer to the first step is affirmative), the Court must then 
determine whether this violation is a reasonable limit within the meaning of s. 1.  The test for 
determining whether a violation is a reasonable limit within the meaning of s. 1 was set out by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.  
10Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493. 
11R.S.A. 1980, c. I-2.  
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The Supreme Court of Canada in a virtually unanimous opinion held that the Alberta 
Individual Rights Protection Act violated the s.15 of the Charter in its failure to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and that this was not a 
reasonable limit on Vriend’s equality rights.  Moreover, on remedy, the Court was of 
the view that this was one of those exceptional cases where it was appropriate to read 
sexual orientation into the Act.12  
This case stands in striking contrast to the various U.S. state laws which have 
attempted to prohibit anti-discrimination laws, and the constitutional challenges to 
those laws.  Here, the Canadian Supreme Court forced the legislature to adopt an 
anti-discrimination law.  The case represented the first ‘real’ victory.  The Court was 
unanimous that the Alberta law was discriminatory, and that the discrimination was 
not a reasonable limit.  The overwhelming majority of the Court agreed with the 
remedy of reading in.13  Vriend would appear then as an unadultered legal victory.  
Except that the province of Alberta, and the voices of social conservatism across the 
country, went apoplectic. In Alberta, politicians, lobbyists and the conservative 
media demanded that the legislature overrule the Supreme Court.14  The Vriend 
decision ignited a powerful anti-judicial movement, which charges the courts, and 
the Supreme Court of Canada in particular, with ‘judicial activism’–the idea that 
courts are inappropriately writing social policy rather than deciding narrow points of 
law.  The critique takes various forms, from more moderate demands for greater 
transparency and accountability in the appointment of judges, to the extreme voices 
of moral conservatism demanding constitutional amendments and the abolition of the 
Supreme Court.  The critique of judicial activism has gained tremendous momentum, 
and has seeped into the mainstream media coverage of major Supreme Court of 
Canada.  While Vriend may represent a legal victory, it is a legal victory that has 
ignited a powerful and ferocious backlash that has rapidly become part of the popular 
discourse.  It is a legal victory which has spawned the seeds of its own potential 
defeat.   
The fourth and final case, M. v. H., involved two women who lived together in a 
same sex relationship for 10 years.  When their relationship broke down, the woman 
known as M., brought an application for spousal support against H.  The governing 
                                                                
12Once a Charter inconsistency has been identified, the next step is to determine which 
remedy is appropriate.  The Court may strike down the legislation, severe the offending 
sections, strike down or sever a provision with a temporary suspension of the declaration of 
invalidity, read down a provision, or read provisions into the legislation.  This last remedy, 
whereby the Court reads words and/or provisions in the legislation, is referred to as “reading 
in”. 
There was one dissenting opinion on the issue of remedy.  Mr. Justice Major (from 
Alberta) was of the view that the Alberta government may prefer to have no human rights 
code at all, rather than have to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground, and that this 
was a choice better left to the legislature.  
13See discussion, supra note 12.  
14Section 33 of the Charter includes what is known as the ‘notwithstanding clause’.  A 
legislature may invoke s. 33 of the Charter when it enacts a law, providing that the law is 
constitutional notwithstanding the provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  It has 
only been invoked in very rare circumstances, and is considered to be an exceptional 
government measure.   
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family statute–the Ontario Family Law Act15 included spousal support obligations for 
opposite sex common law couples, but not same sex couples.  Section 29 of the Act 
defined the term “spouse” to also include unmarried opposite sex couples “who had 
cohabited …continuously for a period of not less than three years”.16  M. challenged 
the constitutionality of the definition of spouse, arguing that the exclusion of same 
sex couples violated section 15 of the Charter.  H was joined by the Ontario 
government, and many right wing organizations who intervened to support the 
constitutionality of the existing definition of spouse.  
M. won.  The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the opposite sex 
definition of spouse discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, and was not a 
reasonable limit on equality rights.  Justice Cory, writing for the majority on s. 15, 
held that same sex relationships may be a conjugal within the meaning of s. 29 of the 
FLA.  In his view “same sex couples will often make long, lasting, loving and 
intimate relationships.  The choices they make in the context of those relationships 
may give rise to the financial dependence of one partner on the other”.17  Section 29 
of the Act violates the human dignity of lesbian and gay couples by promoting the view 
that they are “less worthy of recognition and protection” and “incapable of forming 
intimate relationships of economic interdependence as compared to opposite-sex 
couples.”18  Further, the exclusion of same sex couples in the Act further “perpetuates 
the disadvantages suffered by individuals in same-sex relationships and contributes to 
the erasure of their existence.”19  The Court therefore concluded that the definition of 
spouse in s. 29 of the FLA was in violation of s.15 of the Charter.  
In the s.1 analysis, the majority held that the exclusion of same sex couples was 
not rationally related to the objectives underlying the spousal support provisions in 
Part III of the Family Law Act.  Justice Iacobucci affirmed the objective of the Act as 
stated by the Ontario Law Reform Commission in its Report on the Rights and 
Responsibilities of Cohabitants Under the Family Law Act,20 and as adopted by the 
courts below: “The purpose of the FLA is to provide for the equitable resolution of 
economic disputes that arise when intimate relationships between individuals who 
have been financially interdependent break down. (Parts I-IV).”21  In terms of the 
spousal support provisions in Part III of the Act, the Court again adopted the 
objectives stated by the Ontario Law Reform Commission as “the equitable 
resolution of economic disputes that arise when intimate relationships between 
individuals who have been financially interdependent break down” and the 
alleviation of “the burden on the public purse by shifting the obligation to provide 
support for needy persons to those parents and spouses who have the capacity to 
                                                                
15R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. 
16Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, F. 3, s. 29.  
17M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 58. 
18Id. at para. 73.  
19Id. 
20Ontario, Law Reform Commission, Report on the Rights and Responsibilities of 
Cohabitants Under the Family Law Act, 43-44 (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General 
1993). 
21M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 85. 
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provide support to these individuals”.22  In the Court’s view, both of these objectives 
would only be furthered if same sex couples were included within the definition of 
spouse.   
On the issue of remedy, the Court declared s.29 to be of no force and effect, with 
a suspension of the operation of the declaration of invalidity for six months to enable 
the legislature to consider ways of bringing this provision, and other laws, into 
conformity with the equality rights in the Charter.23  Unlike in Vriend, the Court was 
of the view that it would be inappropriate to read same sex couples into the Act.  
Rather, and possibly defensive in the face of the growing judicial activism critique, 
the Court tossed the issue back to the provincial legislature to fix, though with clear 
directions that the law needed to be fixed.   
BEYOND THE VICTORY 
The decision in M v. H. was ground breaking.  For the very first time, the Court 
recognized the legitimacy of gay and lesbian relationships, and held that those 
relationships are entitled to legal protection.  Within six years, the spirit of the 
powerful dissent from Mossop had become the majority opinion.  Compared with the 
legal struggles in the United States, M. v. H. may sound like an unequivocal victory 
if ever there was one. I do not mean to suggest that the decision is not a victory.  Any 
other result would have been a tremendous set-back for the struggle for the legal 
recognition of same sex relationships, and gay and lesbians rights more generally.  
However,  it is important to put the decision into a broader framework, including the 
reactions that it set off.  Legal victories are never simply legal victories.    
In the aftermath of the decision, while gay men and lesbians and their allies 
rejoiced, conservatives went into predictable convulsions.  As Gwen Landolt, vice-
president of R.E.A.L. Women (a conservative women’s organization) pronounced: 
“They’ve opened the gates to the pack-dogs to attack the traditional family”.24  
Others, like Canada Family Action Coalition and Focus on the Family (social 
conservative organizations devoted to protecting the “traditional” family) denounced 
the decision, and demanded that governments immediate over rule it, by invoking the 
notwithstanding clause.   
Within a few days of the decision, the federal government approved a motion by 
a vote of 216-55, brought by the Reform Party stating that “it is necessary to state 
that marriage is and should remain the union of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others”, and that Parliament “will take all necessary steps” within its 
jurisdiction “to preserve the definition of marriage in Canada.”25  The motion was 
entirely symbolic–it has no legal force.  To protect the common law definition of 
marriage from constitutional challenge in the courts, Parliament would have to 
reproduce the definition in legislation that included a notwithstanding clause.  But, 
symbolic it was.  The motion was an unequivocal statement that the institution of 
marriage was not on the negotiating table.  Of course, the very fact that the federal 
                                                                
22Id. at para. 93.  See also id. at para. 106. 
23Id. at paras. 145-47. 
24Carmen Wittmeier, Playing House: Politicians Cower as the Supreme Court Overrides 
the Natural Family Order, ALBERTA REPORT 21 (1999). 
25House of Commons Debates, No. 240 (8 June 1999) at 1020. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
54 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:49 
politicians felt compelled to make this statement meant that marriage was in fact to 
become the next legal battleground.26  
The judicial activism critique went into overdrive.  Right wing politicians 
assailed the ruling as anti-democratic.  One Reform Party Member of Parliament 
called the ruling “one of the most outrageous exercises of raw judicial power in the 
history of modern democracy.”27  Responsible government itself, he says, is 
threatened by judicial usurpation of the role of elected legislators.28  The judicial 
activism critique was echoed throughout the Canadian mainstream media.  In some, 
it was represented as one amongst a range of diverse opinions about the decision.  In 
others, like the right wing National Post, it had become front page news, and the 
only really legitimate lens through which to view the decision.  The Supreme Court 
of Canada ruling in M. v. H. had strengthened the resolve and the momentum of the 
backlash.  
The very same month that the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its historic 
ruling on same sex rights, a gay bar in Toronto was raided by police, and 36 men 
were charged with criminal indecency and other criminal offenses.  The Bijou was 
part bar, part gay porn theatre.  Gay men had sex there.  They had been doing for 
years, just as they did at the bath houses.  While the Supreme Court of Canada 
recognized and validated a legitimate gay and lesbian legal subject, it was not 
coincidental that this was a family subject.  It was a nice, nuclear, monogamous 
family unit, which even stayed within fairly traditional gender, if not sex, roles.  The 
new legal subject was not a sexual subject, but a desexualized subject.  It was not, 
absolutely not, the erotically charged subject of the gays bars and bath houses who 
remain sexual outlaws.  It was a highly desexualized subject–a 12 year lesbian 
relationship that had broken down.  M and H clearly weren’t having sex anymore.   
The decision requires that we think about the contradictory implications of 
inclusion, as a process in which someone else will always be excluded.  As Ratna 
                                                                
26In the aftermath of M v. H. gay and lesbian activists are now turning their attention to the 
final frontier–marriage.  In this respect, the Canadian struggle for gay and lesbian rights is 
markedly different from the U.S., where the struggle for relationship recognition has very 
much been about marriage.  In Canada, the existence of ascribed or common law definitions of 
spouse provided a more obvious target for legal challenges.  Gay and lesbian activists 
demanded that same sex couples be treated the same as unmarried opposite sex couples.  But, 
now in the aftermath of the legislative responses to M v. H., discussed infra at , and all 
unmarried cohabiting couples are treated the same in law regardless of sexual orientation, the 
focus has shifted to marriage.  Challenges are percolating in several provinces.  A 
constitutional challenge was started in Quebec.  In 2000, several same sex couples went to 
City Hall in Toronto, and sought a marriage licence.  The City is seeking legal counsel on 
whether the law now requires that marriage licenses be issued to same sex couples, and is 
likely going to seek judicial reference.  Another challenge is being started by a lesbian couple 
in British Columbia, where the provincial government has indicated its support for the 
challenge.  For a discussion of the vulnerability of the opposite sex definition of marriage to a 
Charter challenge, see Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, The Legal Regulation of Adult 
Personal Relationships: Evaluating Policy Objectives and Legal Options in Federal 
Legislation, LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA (2000).  
27Supra note 25.  
28Id.  
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Kapur writes, “there will always be another other”.29  In Canada, as elsewhere, sex 
workers, sadomasochism communities, and other sexually charged subjects remain 
outlaws–firmly located outside of the law.30  The inclusion of ‘legitimate’ gay and 
lesbian subjects into law is precisely such a contradictory process.  It is a process in 
which the margins of acceptability and legitimacy, of white-picket fenceness, is 
being policed–quite literally.  The inclusion of gay and lesbian subjects into law is 
being regulated at its margins to ensure that the ‘others’–the sexually promiscuous, 
non-monogamous, public sex affecionados–remain outlaws.  Indeed, there is reason 
to worry that the process of inclusion may have destabilized the gentleman’s 
agreement that appeared to have prevailed since the stormy days of the bathhouse 
raids in Toronto in the early 1980s.  Despite the continued threat of surveillance, 
particularly through liquor licensing laws, the moral regulators had grudgingly ceded 
a space of privacy to the bathhouses.  As gay and lesbian family subjects are 
becoming in-laws, the erotically charged subject is being re-outed in law.  While 
they have long lived in the shadows of outlaw status, these subjects were not quite 
criminals.  These sexualized bodies are now being recast as outlaws, as having 
transgressed the criminal border.   
The uproar in the gay community lead to the charges against the men at the Bijou 
to be dropped.  But, that has not ended this new regulation of the erotic outlaw.  
Other gay bars where sex has been known to take place are being subject to an 
intensified regulation.  The Barn, another venerable gay institution in the gay ghetto 
in Toronto–was raided by the Toronto Police in the summer of 2000.  The official 
reason was one of alleged liquor license violations.  But, the sexually charged 
atmosphere is clearly the target.  The organizers have been charged with “disorderly 
conduct” under the Liquor License Control Act, and the allegedly disorderly conduct 
involved the fact that men were dancing in the nude.  In September 2000, the Pussy 
Palace, a special event Women’s Bath House, was raided by the Toronto police, 
again for alleged liquor license violations.  This was only the fourth Women’s Bath 
House event ever held in Toronto (the organizers rented the space from what was 
otherwise a men’s bathhouse).  Five male police officers raided the premises, 
wandered the hallways and private rooms for several hours, and ultimately laid six 
charges of liquor license violations.  Once again, three of these charges are for 
“disorderly conduct”.  According the statements made by the police to the press, 
these disorderly conduct charges are in relation to the allegation that sex was 
occurring where liquor was being consumed.  While the liquor licensing laws 
provide the police with a sweeping discretionary power to enter and search premises 
under the auspices of checking for liquor license infractions, the target clearly 
remains the sexually charged atmosphere.  Although the police are repeatedly unable 
to support or sustain criminal charges, the Liquor License Control Act gives them the 
                                                                
29Ratna Kapur, Law and the Sexual Subaltern: A Comparative Perspective this volume. 
30For a general discussion of the construction of these identities as marginal and outlaws 
see MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER 
LIFE (1999); BRENDA COSSMAN ET AL., BAD ATTITUDE/S ON TRIAL: PORNOGRAPHY, FEMINISM 
AND THE BUTLER DECISION (1997); Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of 
the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. 
Vance ed., 1984); Anne McClintock, Maid to Order: Commerical Fetishism and Gender 
Power, 37 SOCIAL TEXT 87 (1993).  
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power to intensify their moral regulation.31  And the moral regulators can hide 
behind the legal inclusion of legitimate gay and lesbian subjects.  This is no longer 
about homophobia or discrimination against gay men, they can say.  Look at those 
nice gay men over there, with their nice homes and dogs, who pay property taxes and 
invest in the stock market–we don’t discriminate against them.  We are just 
concerned with those who refuse to respect the Law, those who do not assimilate, 
those who insist on flaunting their sexuality.  Flaunting ‘it’–if ‘it’ is sex–still makes 
you an outlaw.  
In evaluating the contradictory nature of the victory, it is also important to 
consider what same sex couples have won.  In M v. H., gay men and lesbians have 
won the right to sue each other when their relationships break down.  Indeed, they 
have won the right to behave every bit as badly as straight couples when their 
relationships breakdown.  It is absolutely no coincidence that the first major legal 
victory in the recognition of same sex relationships involved spousal support, or 
alimony.  It was not a case that involved benefits from the government.  It was not a 
case that involved benefits from employers.  It was the perfect case for these days of 
‘fiscal responsibility’.  It was equality that would not cost the government any 
money.  In fact, it was equality that would actually help save the government money, 
by privatizing support obligations.   
The result of the ruling is the expansion of the scope of spousal support 
obligations to include a whole new set of relationships.  Individuals within same sex 
relationships now fall within the realm of ‘family’ members who will be expected to 
provide support for one another  both during the relationship, and after the 
relationship breaks down.  Indeed, the Court itself placed considerable emphasis on 
the goal of  “reducing the strain on the public purse” by “shifting the financial burden 
away from the government and on to those partners with the capacity to provide support 
for dependent spouses.”32  The ruling is consistent with the agenda of fiscal 
responsibility–of expanding the private support obligations of individual family 
members, and thereby reducing the demands on the state.  It is no coincidence that 
the very first same sex relationship victory is one that fits within the agenda of fiscal 
conservatism, the privatization of support obligations, and the demise of the welfare 
state.  
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Ontario provincial government responded more 
cautiously to the decision.  Although the Government is a very conservative one (one 
of the most socially and fiscally conservative seen in recent years) the response to 
the decision was decidedly measured.  Premier Harris stated that although he did not 
personally agree with the decision, there were no further avenues of appeal, and that 
his government would abide by the ruling.33  Within six months, the Government 
introduced a law (known as Bill 5) to amend the common law definitions of spouse 
in 67 pieces of legislation to include same sex couples.  The law was entitled An Act 
                                                                
31For a discussion of similar trend of moral regulation in the United States, see WARNER, 
supra note 30.  
32M v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 98. 
33Ontario will abide by a high court ruling on the definition of ‘spouse’, CANADIAN PRESS, 
May 20, 1999.  
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to Amend Certain Statutes Because of the Supreme Court Canada Decision in M v. 
H.34  In a clever piece of marketing, the Ontario government told the public that it 
did not want to pass this law.  MPP Smitherman, among others, has observed, they 
may as well have called it ‘the devil made me do it act’.  In introducing the Bill, the 
Attorney General Flaherty clearly stated “This legislation is clearly not part of our 
agenda.”35  He emphasized that “The only reason we are introducing this Bill is 
because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision.  We would not introduce the 
legislation otherwise.”36  
But, notwithstanding its grudging attitude, the law did everything that the 
Supreme Court ruling required in letter and spirit.  It changed the definition not only 
in s.29 of the Family Law Act, but it also changed 66 other definitions.  Same sex 
couples are now, under Ontario law, treated exactly the same as unmarried opposite 
sex couples, with one exception.  Same sex couples are not called “spouses”.  They 
are called “common law partners”.37  The Bill introduced this new term into the 
existing ascribed definitions of spouse.  While the term is different, the content of the 
definition is the same, that is, both spouse and partner are defined as people who 
“live together in a conjugal relationship”.  But, spouse involves a man and a woman, 
and partner involves any two individuals.   
The reason for not calling same sex couples ‘spouses’ was as political as the title 
of the Act.  The Ontario Government was attempting to appease its ‘family values’ 
constituency, by defending the traditional definition of spouse.  The Attorney 
General, in introducing the legislation, made this agenda very clear.  “Our proposed 
legislation complies with the decision while preserving the traditional values of the 
family by protecting the definition of spouse in Ontario law”.38  Flaherty was 
emphatic that the new law would not in any way affect marriage or the traditional 
definition of spouse.  “It is important for members to be aware of that fundamental in 
this debate, that marriage is not affected by this bill.  Marriage, as members know, 
involves a man and a woman in Ontario.  We have preserved in the bill the 
traditional definition of ‘spouse’ and ‘marital status’”39 
In law, the distinction between the two terms makes no difference.  Both 
unmarried opposite sex couples and same sex couples are entitled to the same rights 
and responsibilities.  There continues to be some distinctions between the rights and 
responsibilities of these couples, and married couples.  For example, the division of 
property on relationship breakdown continues to be limited exclusively to married 
couples.40  As a result, same sex couples, who remain unable to marry, have no 
                                                                
34S.O. 1999, c. 6. 
35Government of Ontario Press Release, Ontario protects traditional definition of spouse 
in legislation necessary because of Supreme Court of Canada decision in M.v.H., October 25, 
1999.  Also located at http://www.newswire.ca/government/ontario/english/release/ 
October1999/25/c7058.html. 
36Id.  
37See An Act to Amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in M.v.H., 2 S.C.R. 3.  
38Ontario Attorney General, 1999. 
39Hansard, 1st session, 37th Parliament, Wed 27 Oct. 1999. 
40Family Law Act, R.S.O., 1990, s. 1 (1) (1990) (Can.).  
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access to this legal regime.  However, it is important to keep in mind that the 
challenge in M v. H was a challenge to the ascribed or common law definition of 
spouse.  It was never a challenge to the opposite sex definition of marriage.  
Measured against this initial challenge, the legislative amendments ought to be seen 
as huge victory.  Not only was the definition of spouse in the spousal support 
provisions amended, but all ascribed definitions were amended.  Same sex couples 
are now entitled not only to sue each when their relationship ends, but are also 
entitled to the range of other rights and responsibilities accorded to cohabiting 
heterosexual couples under provincial law.   
Some voices within the gay and lesbian community have turned this victory into 
defeat.  Under the rallying cry “separate but equal”, some gay and lesbian rights 
activists denounced the new law for refusing to recognize same sex couples as 
spouses.  Indeed, M. brought an application asking that the Supreme Court of 
Canada review the new law.  She argued that the new law failed to comply with the 
Court’s ruling in M v. H., and that the law was itself discriminatory.  From a purely 
technical point of view, there was some merit to the claim.  The refusal to recognize 
same sex couples as spouses was quite clearly animated by a discriminatory 
sensibility.  It would not be beyond the pale to establish that the exclusion of same 
sex couples from the definition of spouse was a violation of the equality rights 
provisions in section 15 of the Charter.  In turning to the s. 1 analysis of whether the 
violation is a reasonable limit on those equality rights, one of the crucial steps 
involves interrogating the objective of the legislation.41  The objective must be 
pressing and substantial.42   The objective of the exclusion must also be legitimate.43   
This is where the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the definition of spouse could 
run into some difficulty.  The objective of the exclusion was quite explicitly to 
continue to give preferential status to the opposite sex definition of spouse.  But, 
preferring one status over another violates s. 15 of the Charter, and the Court has 
suggested that it cannot be a legitimate objective.  In an early constitutional case, the 
Supreme Court held that the purpose of Sunday closing laws was to compel 
observance of the Christian Sabbath.44  The Court held that preferring Christianity 
was not a legitimate objective because it undermined the right to equality on the 
basis of the religion.  Similarly, it may be argued that the promotion of marriage and 
the traditional definition of spouse as an opposite sex institution may not be a 
legitimate objective precisely because it is based on a denial of the equality rights of 
same sex couples.   
That’s the technical argument.  The political and strategic arguments weigh in a 
very different direction.  Bill 5 was a victory–a huge victory.  The distinction 
between spouses and partners, although undoubtedly animated by the Government’s 
need to appease its family values constituency, makes no difference in law.  
Moreover, the application entirely ignored the broader debate about the appropriate 
role of courts, and their relationship with the legislatures that has unfolded around 
these Supreme Court rulings.  The critique of judicial activism is changing, in subtle 
                                                                
41See Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103.  
42Id. 
43See Vriend, 1 S.C.R. 493 at paras. 109-11. 
44R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
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and not so subtle ways, the legal environment in which equality rights will be 
contested.  In its ruling in M. v. H., the Supreme Court of Canada was very careful 
and deliberate in leaving the remedy to the legislature.  It refused to read same sex 
couples into the legislation.  While the ruling was a bold one, it was nonetheless a 
ruling shaped in part by the critique of judicial activism.45  The Court was trying to 
find a way to negotiate through this new landmine, while minimizing the kind of 
controversy generated by its ruling in Vriend.  A crucial part of this negotiation was 
leaving the remedy to the legislatures.  M’s application for a rehearing appeared 
oblivious to this careful negotiation.  The Court was extremely unlikely to wade back 
in to this explosive terrain, given that the Ontario government had responded by 
amending 67 of its laws.   
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for rehearing (with 
costs).  The imposition of costs sent a strong message: don’t waste our time with 
frivolous applications.  Don’t try to force us back onto this explosive terrain.  We 
have ruled.  And the legislature has responded in kind.  End of story.  The 
application for rehearing should be a warning to equality activists.  Know when to 
call it quits.  Know when to call a victory a victory, and move on.  This misguided 
adventure not only cost the applicant a lot of money, but it also managed to turn a 
huge legislative victory into a partial defeat.    
CONCLUSION 
The ruling in M v. H. is a victory.  But, like all legal victories, it is fragile 
(witness the backlash), it is partial (see who is still outside), and it is contradictory 
(consider what has been won).  The law that followed the ruling is also a victory, but 
it too is one that it is contradictory.  Gays and lesbians are partners, leaving the 
spousal fight for another day.  The legislature has clearly signaled its growing 
frustration with the courts.  The failed application for review created a partial defeat 
where there had victory.  Legal victories are, then, never just legal victories.  Legal 
victories are always many things at once.  I do not say this to disparage or denounce 
the role of law.  I do not in any way mean to suggest that gay men and lesbians, and 
other marginalized group, should not be fighting these cases.  We should and we do.  
Rather, my point is that we must equip ourselves with an understanding of what we 
can and should reasonably expect from law.  We need to equip ourselves to go right 
back to the drawing board when we think that we have won a case, to figure out what 
we have also lost.  Conversely, we have to go straight back to the same drawing 
board when we think we have lost, and figure out what we have won.  This is not a 
choice about engaging with law.  This is not a choice about whether or not we should 
go to Court.  More often than not, it’s the only game in town.  We have to stay in the 
game.  But, we must also continue to complicate our strategies.  While we claim 
victory in our media sound bites, we must remain vigilant in considering the broad 
and contradictory implications of whatever we’ve just won.  The contradictions are 
always there, simmering beneath the surface.  It is our responsibility to grapple with 
them, before they come back to haunt us.  
                                                                
45Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, M. v. H.: Time to Clean Up Your Acts, 10 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM 1 (1999).   
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